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JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon the 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated 78-2 (a)-3 (2) (g) (1989) . 
As this is a district court case involving domestic relations, 
specifically divorce or annulment. 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second 
Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT 
THE VOID MARRIAGE MUST HAVE HAD A DECREE DECLARING IT 
VOID TO BE VOID. 
Standard of review: "An error is reversible if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would 
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of 
the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222 
(Utah 1983). 
Supporting authority: Proctor v. Ins. Co. of N. 
America, 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986); Sanders v. Indus. 
Comm'n.. 230 P. 1026 (Utah 1924); Rice v. State. 370 N.E.2d 
902, 903 (Ind. 1977); Persche v. Jones 387 N.W.2d 32, 37 (S.D. 
1986); Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989). 
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE VOID WHERE THE PARTIES MARRIAGE WAS, 
BY DEFINITION, VOID AB INITIO. 
Standard of review: "An error is reversible if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would 
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of 
the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222 
(Utah 1983). 
iv 
Supporting authority: 52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, 
section 67, p. 920; Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989); Utah 
Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989). 
C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING 
JURISDICTION OVER A DIVORCE ACTION PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. 30-1-17.2 WHERE THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE WAS 
VOID AB INITIO. 
Standard of review: "An error is reversible if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would 
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of 
the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222 
(Utah 1983). 
Supporting authority: Caffal v. Caffal 303 P.2d 286. 
288 (Utah 1956); Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989); Utah Code 
Ann. 30-1-17.2 (1989). 
D. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BOTH 
PARTIES WERE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMPEDIMENT. 
Standard of review: "An error is reversible if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would 
have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of 
the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217, 222 
(Utah 1983). 
Supporting authority: Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l. 
Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); Time Commercial 
Financing Corp. v. Brimhall. 575 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1978); 
Powers v. Gene's Building Material. Inc.. 567 P.2d 174, 176 
(Utah 1977). 
E. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 60 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. "This 
court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary." Donohue v. Int. Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 
68 (Utah 1987). 
Supporting authority: Donohue v. Int. Health Care. 
Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2(2) (1989). 
(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom 
the person marrying has not been divorced; 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989). 
When there is doubt as to the validity of a marriage, 
either party may, in a court of equity in a county where either 
party is domiciled, demand its avoidance or affirmance, but 
when one of the parties was under the age of consent at the 
time of the marriage, the other party, being of proper age, 
shall have no such proceeding for that cause against the party 
under age. The judgment in the action shall either declare the 
marriage valid or annulled and shall be conclusive upon all 
persons concerned with the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17(2) (1989). 
If the parties have accumulated any property or 
acquired any obligations subsequent to the marriage, or there 
is a genuine need arising from economic change of circumstances 
due to the marriage, or if there are children born, or 
expected, the court may make temporary and final orders, and 
subsequently modify the orders, relating to the parties, their 
property and obligations, the children and their custody and 
visitation, and the support and maintenance of the parties and 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the District Court memorandum 
decision denying Plaintiff/Appellant's motion to set aside Decree 
of Divorce. Plaintiff/Appellant is the husband of a void marriage 
and seeks to have the Decree of Divorce set aside because the 
marriage was void ab initio. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The husband, now the Appellant, filed a divorce Complaint on 
May 17, 1988. The Decree of Divorce was signed December 20, 1989. 
A Motion to Set aside Decree of Divorce was filed January 22, 1990. 
The trial court heard oral arguments on the Plaintiff's Motion on 
February 26, 1990, at 10:30 a.m.. At that time the trial court 
asked that the parties brief the matter and that it be reheard. 
The parties briefed their positions and a hearing was held on May 
14, 1990, at 11 a.m.. The trial judge then entered his memorandum 
decision denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce. 
C. RELEVANT FACTS 
The parties herein were married to each other on June 15, 
1984, in Teton County, State of Wyoming. (See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, signed December 20, 1989) . Gaylene Van Der 
Stappen ("Appellee") had been previously been married to Richard 
Paul Opheikens. At the time the parties herein were married, 
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Appellee was not yet divorced from Richard Paul Opheikens. (See 
Exhibit B attached to Affidavit of Plaintiff dated January 19, 
1990). Wilbert Van Der Stappen ("Appellant") was not aware that 
Appellee's previous divorce had not been finalized. (See Affidavit 
of Plaintiff, paragraph 5) . After Appellee's previous marriage was 
finally dissolved, the parties continued to live together until 
sometime before the divorce action was filed. After the Decree of 
Divorce was entered, Appellant, having been made aware of the 
impediment of the marriage, sought to have the Decree of Divorce 
set aside pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
to have a Decree of Annulment entered. It is relevant that the 
entire case was decided on unrecorded oral arguments. The only 
evidentiary facts submitted to the court on the motion to set aside 
Decree of Divorce was an Affidavit of Plaintiff in support of his 
Motion. The Defendant never filed an Affidavit in objection to 
Plaintiff's motion, nor was there any other evidence entered. The 
record essentially consists of pleadings, motions, orders and 
minute entries, etc. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The type of marriage in this case, that of a second marriage 
where the first marriage of the wife has not yet been dissolved is 
prohibited and declared void in Utah. Not only is it void, it is 
void ab initio. Consequently, the law states that it is not 
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necessary to have the marriage declared void by Decree of court or 
administrative order. Rather, the marriage is void by legislative 
declaration and nothing more need happen to make it null. This 
argument is supported by Utah Case Law, as well as general common 
law. 
Since the marriage is void ab initio, then it is impossible 
to enter a Decree of Divorce, as there never was a marriage. The 
marriage in this case is not voidable where it can be ratified, 
confirmed, or the parties have some option to either declare it 
annulled or do otherwise. In this case, the marriage is void. 
Utah Statute makes allowance to determine the validity of a 
marriage but in this case there is no determination to be made. 
Clearly on its face and by the factual evidence available in the 
way of exhibits attached to Affidavit of Plaintiff, the marriage 
is clearly void. Therefore, there is no need for any type of 
judicial decree, in particular, a Decree of Divorce cannot stand. 
Additionally, the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue the Decree of Divorce. Utah Case Law has 
established lack of jurisdiction where there is no legal marriage. 
Also, there is no common law marriage in this case, as the 
statutory requirements were not fulfilled. It is essential for a 
common law marriage to be recognized, the court must recognize it 
within one year after the relationship has terminated. As the 
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requirements of the statute were not fulfilled, the court cannot 
now recognize a common law marriage. Consequently, there cannot 
be a divorce as there was not a common law marriage. 
Moreover, had there been a common law marriage, equity would 
allow the innocent party, namely Appellant, to have the marriage 
annulled due to fraud. 
There is almost no evidentiary record in this case. The only 
evidentiary record is the Affidavit of Plaintiff, signed by 
Plaintiff on the 19th day of January, 1990, which states that at 
the time of signing the Affidavit, he had only recently discovered 
the impediment to the marriage. Oral arguments were heard on 
Plaintiff's Motion but the arguments were not recorded. Likewise 
there was no testimony taken. Based on the scant evidentiary 
evidence provided, the trial court found that both parties were 
aware of the impediment shortly after the marriage was contracted. 
Appellant believes this is an abuse of the court's discretion based 
on the factual record before the trial court, as well as the law. 
To conclude, the marriage was void from its inception. It was 
not necessary to decree the marriage void, as the legislature had 
done that expressly. If the marriage was void, then the Decree of 
Divorce should also be void. A common law marriage never occurred, 
as the statutory requirements were never fulfilled. Had they been 
fulfilled, Appellant would still be entitled to an annulment of the 
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marriage. The court's only conclusion from this can be that the 
Decree of Divorce is void and that the marriage should be 
considered void ab initio, and if necessary/ an annulment entered. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND 
APPELLEE WAS VOID AB INITIO 
"The following marriages are prohibited and declared void: •.. 
(2) When there is a husband or wife living, from whom the person 
marrying has not been divorced...." Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2 (1989). 
According to the statute, the marriage is prohibited and is 
declared void. This would indicate that the legislature declared 
such marriage void as a matter of law. The Utah Court of Appeals 
"will interpret and apply the statute according to its literal 
wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Cox v. 
Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Const., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Since the language clearly states that the 
marriage is declared void, an ordinary interpretation of the 
statute would imply that the legislature has declared the marriage 
void, and consequently "no judicial Decree is ordinarily necessary 
to avoid the result." Rice v. State. 370 NE.2d 902, 903 (Ind. 
1977), see also Persche v. Jones. 387 NW.2d 32, 37 (S.D. 1986). 
"It is within the legislative power to prohibit bigamy or 
polygamy." 52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section 67, p. 920. Simply 
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put, the marriage is void from its inception, meaning that it is 
not necessary for a judicial Decree to destroy what never was 
created. 
Indeed, "the general rule is that no decree is necessary to 
declare a bigamous marriage void." 52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section 
67, p. 920. 
More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that no 
decree of a court is necessary to determine a marriage nullity when 
the marriage is void ab initio. See Sanders v. Industrial Comm. 
230 P 1026 (Utah 1924). Sanders was a case before the industrial 
commission to determine whether a putative wife was a Defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that since the marriage was void ab 
initio pursuant to the then-current version of U.C.A. 30-1-2, no 
decree was necessary to void the marriage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that "a second 
marriage before a divorce has ended a prior marriage is void ab 
initio." Proctor v. Ins. Co, of No. America, 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 
(Utah 1986) . In the same paragraph the court also stated that such 
a marriage is illegal. Id. at 1158. Where the court has recently 
reaffirmed that the second marriage prior to removal of impediment 
is void ab initiof it stands to reason that the court should also 
reaffirm that no Decree is necessary, as stated in Sanders. 
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B. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE MUST BE VOID WHERE 
THE MARRIAGE WAS VOID 
Utah law is clear that a second marriage entered into prior 
to the first marriage being dissolved is void ab initio as well as 
illegal, and that no court decree is necessary. If that is the 
case, there cannot be a valid Decree of Divorce, as there was no 
valid marriage to be terminated. 
This is not a situation where the marriage was voidable (see 
U.CA. 30-1-2(2)) . The marriage was "void from its very inception. 
It is not merely voidable, and therefore cannot be ratified or 
confirmed and so made valid." 52 Am Jur 2d, Marriage, section 67, 
p. 920. In this case, the putative marriage is clearly void ab 
initio. The marriage, as a legal matter, never existed. 
Utah statute provides that where there is doubt as to the 
validity of the marriage, either party may demand its avoidance or 
affirmance. In the proceeding "the judgment and the action shall 
either declare the marriage valid or annulled . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. 3 0-1-17 (1989). The action that has previously been before 
the District Court was the divorce action. Since that time it has 
been established that there is in fact no question but that the 
putative marriage was invalid. However, should the question be 
presented to the court, the court must then determine either that 
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the marriage is valid or annulled. Neither has been done by the 
court. The court has simply ruled that the divorce shall stand. 
In effect, Appellant has sought relief pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 30-1-17 (1989) by attempting to set aside the Decree of 
Divorce pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Based upon Utah Code Ann. 30-1-17 (1989) , Appellant is entitled 
to his relief, and the court should grant the annulment, declaring 
the marriage void. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Caffal v. Caffal. 303 
P.2d 286 (Utah 1956) "that the court here had not jurisdiction of 
the subject matter since there had been no legal marriage." Id. 
at 288. The putative marriage in Caffal is quite similar to the 
situation at bar. In Caffal it was the wife whose previous 
marriage which had not been dissolved prior to the putative 
marriage, and the parties were nonetheless "married". Later there 
was a divorce which the husband subsequently opposed after the 
Decree had been entered due to the husband's default. 
The important similarities go toward the court's remarks about 
jurisdiction. The court acknowledged in that situation that they 
did not have jurisdiction over the matter. However, the court 
felt that the husband had unclean hands in the matter as he was 
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aware of the impediment at the time of the marriage. 
Therein lies the key difference between Caffal and the case 
at bar. While Caffal is similar to the present case insofar as the 
court1s lack of jurisdiction. The differences between the two 
cases preclude this court from following Caffal to the same result. 
In the case at bar, Appellant was not aware of the impediment at 
the time they were married and was not made aware of the impediment 
until some time after the Decree of Divorce was entered. 
Whereas in Caffal the court felt the husband had committed 
some fraud on the court by not raising any objections at the time 
of the divorce, the husband in this case was not aware of the 
impediment at the time of the divorce. In effect, the husband in 
this case is an innocent party and should not be punished for the 
fraud, whether intentionally or unintentionally committed by the 
wife. 
In Caffal the husband waited several years before objecting 
to the divorce. In the case at bar, Appellant's objection was 
timely made. 
The court should follow the ruling in Caffal that the subject 
matter jurisdiction does not lie over a void marriage in this case, 
but should not follow the court in Caffal in finding rational to 
skirt the jurisdictional problem and sustain the Decree of Divorce. 
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D. THERE IS NO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN THIS CASE 
AND THUS NO VALID MARRIAGE 
Assuming arguendo that since the parties Appellant and 
Appellee continued to cohabit after the impediment to their 
marriage was removed, the marriage might be considered a valid 
"common-law" marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1989). 
However, the statute requires that determination of a common law 
marriage must occur during the relationship, or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship. The Decree of 
Divorce was signed on or about December 20, 1989. The trial court 
did not make a determination at that time that there was a common 
law marriage relationship. Since the time of the putative divorce, 
more than one year had expired. Therefore it is now impossible for 
a common law marriage to be recognized by the court. 
Based on the statute the court cannot imply a common law 
marriage, as it was never declared as such. The statute 
specifically requires that there must be a determination by a court 
or administrative order that there is a common law marriage. Utah 
Code Ann. 30-1-4.5(1) (1989). Unlike the marriage which is void 
ab initio, the common law marriage does not exist until it is 
declared as such by a judicial or administrative order. 
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E. IF THERE WERE A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, THE 
MARRIAGE WOULD STILL BE VOID OR VOIDABLE 
Even assuming, arguendo. that there were a common law marriage 
between Appellant and Appellee, equity would preclude such a 
conclusion based on fraud. The innocent party should not be 
prevented from having a marriage which was initially void declaring 
that marriage void. Jones v. Jones, 161 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1935). 
If Appellant were aware of the impediment after the fact, he still 
should have the opportunity to have the marriage declared void. Id. 
If nothing else, at least the marriage should be declared voidable, 
and again, Appellant should have the opportunity to request 
judicial annulment of the marriage. See Jones v. Jones, supra.. 
and Rickard v. Trousard. 508 So.2d 260 (Ala. 1987). 
In Jones, the facts are very similar to the case at hand. The 
wife was still married to a previous husband when she married her 
current husband, Mr. Jones. Some time after the marriage, the 
husband filed for divorce, seeking custody of his daughter. While 
the suit was still pending, undisposed of, the husband first 
discovered that there was an impediment to the marriage. The 
husband thereupon prayed for an annulment rather than a divorce. 
In the wife's Answer, she prayed for support for herself as well 
as custody of the daughter and support for the child. The final 
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Decree awarded entirely the affirmative relief sought by the wife. 
The case was then appealed and came before the Florida Supreme 
Court. 
The Florida Supreme Court held that even though there may have 
been a common law marriage, "where an absolutely void bigamous 
marriage is innocently contracted by one of the parties, in 
ignorance of the existing impediment, and as a result of fraud and 
deceit practiced upon him by the opposite party, the fact that such 
void marriage is subsequently ripened into a presumptively valid 
common law marriage through continued cohabitation of the parties 
after the disbarring prior marriage has been dissolved by death, 
should not bar or preclude the innocent party to such fraud from 
treating the resulting common law marriage as one that is voidable 
within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud practiced 
upon him, and thereupon having a judicial annulment of same, such 
as was sought in this case." Jones, at 839. 
The Florida Court then concluded that first of all, the 
original marriage was void ab initio, and did not require judicial 
decree to avoid the marriage. Id. at 839. Secondly, the court 
held that where the husband was an innocent party to the fraud, not 
being aware of the impediment, he had the right to have the 
marriage annulled within a reasonable time upon discovering the 
impediment. 
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In the case at bar, Appellant seeks the same relief. He only 
recently became aware of the impediment and is now seeking to 
overturn the divorce so that it can be recognized as a void 
marriage. 
F. THE ONLY EVIDENTIARY RECORD IN THIS CASE IS THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
The only evidentiary record in this case is the Affidavit of 
Plaintiff, signed on the 19th day of January, 1990. The Appellate 
Court "will not consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by, the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
Where the record is devoid of evidence, it "consequently does 
not, and cannot, support the findings below." Time Commercial 
Financing Corp. v, Brimhall. 575 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1978). 
Additionally, there is no transcript in this matter. Where 
there is no transcript available for the Appellate Court to review, 
the court "has nothing before it to review". Powers v. Gene's 
Building Material. Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). In Powers, 
Defendant discussed with the trial judge in chambers - and without 
making a record - the possibility of the trial judge being 
disqualified. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded that since there 
was no record to resort to, there was nothing to review. 
In the case at bar, the record is almost void of any indicia 
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of what the trial court could have used to determine that Appellant 
was aware of the impediment to the marriage early in the disputed 
marriage. There is nothing in the record to justify the court's 
decision, but there is evidence to oppose it. The only evidence 
before the Court of Appeals is in the form of the Affidavit of 
Plaintiff which states that he only recently became aware of the 
impediment. The Affidavit should be sufficient to preclude the 
trial court's ruling that Appellant was aware of the impediment 
early in the marriage. Consequently, the Trial Judge's ruling that 
subsection (b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 3 (fraud) of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 cannot stand, nor can the court's 
findings that both parties were aware of the problem from the 
beginning stand as there is no evidentiary basis for the trial 
court's finding. 
The only other record in this case is the memorandum decision 
of the trial court signed June 14, 1990, and the findings and 
conclusion and Order which were all signed September 25, 1990, as 
well as the briefs submitted by the parties in support of their 
legal arguments. This part of the record cannot be considered as 
an evidentiary record as they are findings, conclusions, and orders 
based upon the facts presented to the trial court. 
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G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT BOTH 
PARTIES WERE AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMPEDIMENT 
As previously argued, the only factual record before the court 
was the affidavit of Plaintiff. In the Affidavit, Plaintiff states 
that he "recently discovered that Defendant was not divorced from 
her previous husband..." (See Affidavit of Plaintiff, paragraph 
5) . As there is no other factual record for the court to base its 
findings, it would be error for the trial court to find that both 
parties were aware of the void status of the marriage from a time 
shortly after the ceremony. 
"An error is reversible if there is reasonable likelihood that 
a more favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining 
party in the absence of the error." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth. , 
671 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah 1983). In the case at bar, Appellant 
believes that he would not have agreed to the present terms of the 
Decree had he known there was a void marriage. (See Memorandum 
Decision, page 2). Just as in Jones v. Jones, supra. Appellant 
believes that he should not be obligated to pay any alimony to his 
"ex-wife" based on a void marriage, and had he known the marriage 
was void he would have taken that position from the start. 
The Court of Appeals must look only at the record which is 
before it, which is essentially only the Affidavit of Plaintiff. 
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The record is not sufficient to support the trial courts finding 
that Appellant was aware of the impediment to the marriage early 
on, consequently, the trial court has committed reversible error 
in finding that "both parties were aware of the problem from the 
beginning." Memorandum Decision dated June 14, 1990, page 2. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECREE 
"The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that this 
court will presume that the discretion of the trial court was 
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." 
Donohue v. Int. Mtn. Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987). 
The record before the Court of Appeals clearly shows that 
Appellant was not aware of the impediment to the marriage until 
after the Decree of Divorce was entered by the trial court. 
However the trial court found that both parties were aware of the 
problems from the beginning, although there is no evidence in the 
record to support such finding. The court then goes on to state 
that "it believes the judgment was not void since the marriage had 
not been declared void ab initio prior to the entry of the Decree." 
Memorandum Decision, dated June 14, 1990, page 2. The court also 
said it could only "assume" that without a Decree of Annulment, the 
marriage could be dissolved by divorce. Based upon the record, in 
particular, the trial court1s memorandum decision, in reviewing 
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that in light of the law that has been presented to this court, 
clearly the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, or clearly neither 
the facts nor the law supported the judge's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The marriage, which is the subject of this appeal, was void 
ab initio. Consequently the Decree of Divorce should also be void. 
Appellant does not wish to shirk his duties in supporting his 
child. However, as the parties were only living together for a 
short period of time, and the marriage was void from its inception, 
Appellant asks this court that the Decree of Divorce be voided, and 
that he not be required to pay alimony. The court may either void 
the Decree of Divorce and leave it at that, or may remand the 
matter for a determination by the trial court of what equity 
requires at this point. 
DATED this the <-.ZZ" day of January, 1991. 
JEAN ROBERT BABILIS & ASSOCIATES 
Randall Lee Marshall 
Attorney for Appellant 
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